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Summary
When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces the issue of setting the
concession length. Another key issue is whether or not the concessionare should be
allowed to set the timing of new investments. In this paper we investigate the impact of
concession length and investment timing flexibility on the “concession value”. It is
generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they enable a
concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option
theory suggests that investment flexibility has an intrinsic value, as it allows
concessionaires to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms,
one may argue that long- term contracts, which allow for investment timing flexibility,
should always result in higher concession values. Our result suggests that this is not
always the case. Firstly, investment flexibility does not always increase the concession
value. Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value.
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In recent years there has been a signi￿cant increase of private sector par-
ticipation in the provision of public utilities. Besides the evident failure of
many state-provided services, this process has been driven by the need for
increased capital investments and the lack of public ￿nancial resources (Dosi
and Muraro, 2003).
In this context, concessions play a key role, in those sectors (e.g. water
services) where natural monopoly conditions persist, and ￿competition for
the market￿ is the only viable option to achieve e¢ ciency gains. Under
concession contracts, the goverment retains ownership of the infrastructure
but transfers all risk and responsibility for running the utility, including
responsibility for ￿nancing investments (Marin, 2002).
When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces inter alia the
issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is the degree of
managerial ￿ exibility, namely whether or not the concessionaire should be
allowed to set the timing of new investments.
In this paper we focus on the impact of concession length and investment
￿ exibility on ￿concession value￿ leaving aside the problems arising from
asymmetric information, and ignoring other public objectives1. In other
words, we assume that the government wishes to maximize the value of the
contract, in order to make it more appealing. Some of the bene￿ts arising
from a privately optimal contract could be extracted through concession fees
or eventually transferred to consumers, in terms of a reduction in tari⁄s or
an increase in the quality of the service.
We carry out the analysis referring to the real option literature which,
starting from the seminal works by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Mc-
Donald and Siegel (1985, 1986) has highlighted the analogy between security
options and investment ￿ exibility. Since concessionaires must typically bear
substantial capital expenditure, under uncertainty, the ability to wait and
see before committing a capital outlay has an intrinsic value, since it allows
the concessionaire to avoid costly errors.
The questions addressed in the paper may be summarised as follows.
Does investment timing ￿ exibility always increase the concession value? How
1There is a debate in literature about the optimal length of a concession contract.
Under long -term contracts the regulator may be ￿captured￿by the concessionaire because
of asymmetric information (Williamson, 1985; Posner, 1972). On the other hand, short-
term contracts may lead the concessionaires to under-invest since the return period is too
short (La⁄ont and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong et al.,1994; Littlechild, 2004).
2should concession length be determined in order to maximize the concession
value when the concessionaire has no obligations with regards to the invest-
ment timing?
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple real
option model to evaluate the concession value (the concession￿ s extended
present value). In Section 3 we apply the model by analysing an investment
decision in capacity expansion (a new abstraction plant), using data drawn
from the Italian water service sector. Section 4 provides a brief summary of
the ￿ndings.
2 The model
We use a simpli￿ed version of the model proposed by McDonald and Siegel
(1986). The following assumptions hold:
1. The investment is a large-scale project which generates, once under-
taken, an instantaneous pro￿t ￿ ow ￿t which evolves over time ac-
cording to a geometric Brownian motion with instantaneous expected
return r ￿ ￿ and instantaneous volatility ￿ > 0:
d￿t = (r ￿ ￿)￿tdt + ￿￿tdzt ￿0 = ￿ (1)
where dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian process with mean
zero and variance dt (i.e. E(dzt) = 0, E(dz2
t) = dt), r the risk-free
rate and ￿ the opportunity cost (in annuity terms) to invest at time
zero in the project instead of investing in a similar traded ￿nancial
security. Hereafter, we will refer to r ￿ ￿ as the certainty-equivalent
rate of return.2
2. The concession contract lasts for Tc years.
3. The investment exercise time is ￿ (￿ ￿ Tc).
4. The investment entails a sunk capital cost I; while the residual value
is given by:
S = Ie￿￿(Tc￿￿)=￿
2Since the investment project we are analyzing is not a traded asset, its expected rate
of return is out of equilibrium. ￿ measures the resulting rate of return shortfall, i.e. the
di⁄erence between the equilibrium expected return on a similar traded ￿nancial security
and the return on the non-traded asset (McDonald and Siegel, 1984).
3In order to calculate the project￿ s value we must consider its operating
life (economic life) Tc ￿ ￿. In other words, whenever the concessionaire de-
cides to defer the investment, she reduces the time over which pro￿ts can
be gained by running the utility. According to assumption 4, the residual
value is described as a percentage of the replacement cost. This percentage
depreciates at rate ￿ over the remaining years until the end of the conces-
sion. Therefore, if the ￿rm invests at ￿ = 0 the residual value is equal to
zero, while if the ￿rm invests close to the end of the concession, ￿ = Tc, the
residual value coincides with the replacement cost.
The market value of the project can be evaluated as the expected present
value of discounted cash ￿ ows:
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where E denotes the expectation operator under the risk neutral probability
measure (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
Given the above assumptions, the value of the opportunity to invest, i.e.
the project￿ s Extended Net Present Value, is analogous to a European call
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where ^ V (￿) ￿ ￿
￿ (1￿e￿￿(Tc￿￿)); ^ I = I(1￿e￿(r+
￿
￿ )(Tc￿￿)); ￿ is the expiration
date and ￿￿ the project cash ￿ ow at time ￿. The solution of (3) is given by
the well-known formula derived by Black and Scholes (1973):
F(￿t;t) = e￿￿(￿￿t)￿(d1)^ V (￿t) ￿ e￿r(￿￿t)￿(d2)^ I (4)
where:
d1(￿t) =
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and ￿(￿) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. While the





max[(^ V (￿￿) ￿ ^ I)+;0] = 0 (5)
3Brennan and Schwartz (1985) introduce a similar terminal condition. In their analysis,
though, the contract lease does not provide for any limitation on the number of years over
which the resource can be exploited.
43 The case of a water abstraction plant
The Italian water sector represents an interesting case study to apply the
above model. First of all, Italy has undergone a reform over the past decade
which has established a separation between water resource planning and
the operation of water utilities. Under Law n￿ 36/94, resource planning
is assigned to the local water authority, called ATO,4 which assigns the
operation of water services to a concessionaire and ￿xes the tari⁄.56 Besides
ensuring the maintenance of existing infrastructures, the concessionaire must
typically undertake new investments in order to ful￿ll the standards set by
the ATO and to expand service capacity.7
Secondly, the water sector is characterized by a wide range of feasible
alternative technical solutions planners can choose from as far as the oper-
ation and management of the water utilities are concerned. Technological
innovations have led to the construction of complex systems allow for high
operational ￿ exibility. It is quite common today to design vertical integrated
systems with several interconnections between the network infrastructures,
which can be expanded by sequential or modularized investments. Such sys-
tems can easily be modi￿ed over time in order to face and adapt to changes
in the state variables (e.g. average day demand, number of users, input costs,
etc.). This ￿ exibility, which arises from technical aspects, has an economic
value that is related to the concessionaire￿ s ￿ability￿to decide whether and
when it is optimal to invest in capacity expansion.
By referring to the case of a new water abstraction plant, this section
investigates the relationship between concession length and investment tim-
ing as well as the e⁄ect of concession length on concession value (Extended
Net Present Value).
4The ATOs are taking over control functions which were previously state-run (decen-
tralization). Generally speaking the word ATO refers to both the water authority and the
area where the authority operates.
5The Law compells the ATO to entrust a single operator for the full vertical water
cycle and charge the same tari⁄ within the area where the ATO itself operates.
6The Law n
￿ 36/94 also de￿nes a new pricing mechanism (Metodo Tari⁄ario Normaliz-
zato) which combines the idea of price cap regulation with the full recovery of the service
costs (Bardelli and Muraro, 2003).
7The physical assets needed to provide the service (e.g. pipelines, reservoirs, treatment
plants) are publicly owned.
53.1 The data
In order to meet the contract requirements, the Italian concessionaires have
two alternatives. One option is to provide the service by buying water via
another ￿rm. In this case we assume the NPV is equal to zero since the
price of traded water is established by the ATOs according to ￿solidarity and
fairness criteria￿ . Alternatively, the concessionaire may invest in capacity
expansion. This can be done by constructing a new water abstraction plant
of dimension X.
Assuming a pro￿t function linear in X, we obtain:
￿t = Rt(1 ￿ i)X ￿ CtX (6)
where Rt are the revenues per cubic meter, Ct the operating costs per cubic
meter, X the plant￿ s capacity (m3) and i the volume losses in the network.
We also make the following assumptions:
1. Revenues are non stochastic since the tari⁄s are set by the regulator
over the entire concession period.
2. Operating costs are stochastic and follow a geometric Brownian motion
with a growth rate (r ￿ ￿) and volatility ￿:
dCt = (r ￿ ￿)Ctdt + ￿Ctdzt
3. The risk-free discount rate r is constant over time.
4. The project￿ s residual value at the end of its lifetime is zero.8
Given the above assumptions, the present value of the project is:
^ V = E
￿Z Tc￿￿
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8This assumption seems non-restrictive as capital depreciation functions are generally
of hyperbolic type (Mauer and Ott, 1995) with a substantially high estimated rate of
depreciation ￿. Nevertheless, introducing a residual value in the evaluation model would
not substantially modify our results. Under this hypothesis we obtain a cautious estimate
of the project￿ s Extended Net Present Value.
6while the Extended Net Present Value is given by:
F(￿t;t) = e￿￿(￿￿t)￿(d1)^ V (￿t) ￿ e￿r(￿￿t)￿(d2)I
In detail, the water abstraction plant is made up of: a) a well ￿eld (3 wells);
b) a pumping station; c) a treatment plant; d) a storage system (capacity
equal to 10,000 m3); e) a treatment plant; f) an electrical system for the
equipment installed. The treatment plant includes a ￿ltration process on
Granular Activated Carbon (GAC) and the storage system includes disin-
fection and chlorination procedures.9 The system guarantees a water pro-
vision of about 300 l/s (equivalent to 9,460,800 m3=year) but it is subject
to water losses in the network (i = 20%). We assume that the plant￿ s con-
struction and installment costs are not time-dependent and amount to about











Table 1: Summary of information for the water abstraction plant.
￿Designers and industry experts interviewed agree on esti-
mating the average operational costs of this type of plant at
around 0.13 Euro/m3. ￿￿Revenues per cubic meter have been
determined by a statistical analysis performed over a distribu-
tion whose parameters have been estimated on the basis of the
average tari⁄ paid by users for the provision of drinking water.
￿￿￿The risk-free rate is assumed to be equal to the rate of re-
turn of on? stated-owned bonds. ￿￿￿￿The variance has been
estimated considering analogous investment projects carried out
in the past, whose operating costs were known throughout the
project life.
9See Twort et al. (2000).
73.2 The results
The main results are illustrated in Figure 1, which describes the Extended
Net Present Value (F) for di⁄erent concession lengths Tc = f10;15;20;25;30;35;40g,
and di⁄erent exercise times ￿.10
Figure 1 about here
The concession value is concave in exercise time ￿. This implies that for
given Tc we may ￿nd an interior investment time (￿￿) which maximizes the
concession value F.
By observing Figure 1 several conclusions can be drawn:
1. Let￿ s ￿rst consider the case where the regulator arbitrarily sets Tc and
allows the concessionaire to choose the investment time (￿). The opti-
mal investment time (￿￿), which maximizes the Extended Net Present
Value, varies depending on Tc. For example, assuming Tc = 40 years,
F has a maximum for ￿￿ = 17 years. Everything else being equal, if
Tc is reduced to 30 years, ￿￿ becomes 9 years. Finally, if Tc = 15 years
concession value F consistently decreases in ￿ so that it is optimal to
invest immediately (i.e. ￿￿ = 0). In this case, the investment timing
￿ exibility allowed by the regulator does not increase the project￿ s value
(F ￿ NPV ).11
2. Let￿ s now consider how the optimal concession length (T￿
c ) is a⁄ected
by ￿. The optimal T￿
c is the one maximizing F: If ￿ is equal to zero (i.e.
no ￿ exibility is allowed by the regulator), the concession value collapses
to the conventional NPV . In this case, T￿
c can be chosen by ranking
the NPV s: more speci￿cally, the maximun NPV correponds to T￿
c =
20 years. On the contrary, if ￿ > 0, the optimal concession length
should be chosen by ranking the Fs: For example, if the concessionaire
is allowed to defer the investment for 5 years (i.e. ￿ = 5), the optimal
concession length is T￿
c = 25 years, while if ￿ = 10 years, the maximun
F correponds to T￿
c = 30 years.
10According to assumption 4, when ￿ is equal to Tc (i.e. when the concession contract
ceases), we get F = 0.
11The relationship between ￿






0 if Tc ￿ 20 years
bTc + b
0 if Tc > 20 years
where b = 0;81 and b0 = ￿8;93 (OLS). When Tc ￿ 20 years, the concessionaire is neutral
to signing concession contracts that allow or rule out managerial ￿ exibility.
8If we put the above results together, we ￿nd that in order to maximize
the concession value, the regulator should determine the couple (T￿
c ;￿￿)
that maximizes F (Figure 2). In our example, the maximum F is obtained,
approximately, when T￿
c = 25 years and ￿￿ = 5 years.
Figure 2 about here
3.3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated how the concession length and investment
timing ￿ exibility a⁄ect the concession value. It is generally argued that
long-term contracts are privately valuable as they allow a concessionaire
to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option the-
ory suggests that investment ￿ exibility has a value, as it makes it possible
to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one
may argue that long-term contracts, embedding investment timing ￿ exibil-
ity, should always result in higher concession values.
Our results suggest that this is not always the case, since there is not
a monotone relationship between the Extended Net Present Value and con-
cession length. Firstly, investment ￿ exibility does not always increase the
concession value. For example, under a short-term contract, the concession-
aire￿ s ability to defer irreversible investments may not provide additional
value, since it becomes optimal to invest immediately (the concession￿ s Ex-
tended Net Present Value coincides with to the conventional Net Present
Value).
Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession
value. Since the duration of the concession contract a⁄ects the optimal
investment timing, if a concession contract is ￿too long￿ , the concessionaire
may be forced to postpone investments in order to reduce the uncertainty
over future returns. Again, this may result in a lower Extended Net Present
Value.
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